Blog Yomi – Kesubos #33/Daf 34

We devoted considerable time yesterday to resolving the apparent conflict between our Mishnah, which obligates one who violates his sister to pay a קְנַס or fine in contrast with a Gemara in Makkos which says he receives מַלְקוֹת or lashes.

רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: הָא מַנִּי — רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם. אִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר — אֲפִילּוּ בִּתּוֹ נָמֵי

Reish Lakish said: In accordance with whose opinion is our Mishnah taught? It is according to the opinion of רַבִּי מֵאִיר who doesn’t hold of קָם לֵיה בְּדְרָבָּה מִינֵיה, and says that the perpetrator above receives מַלְקוֹת and has to pay the קְנַס as well. The Gemara asks: If our Mishnah is in accordance with the opinion of רַבִּי מֵאִיר, then it should be consistent with the next Mishnah that follows that notes the punishment for violating one’s daughter, for which the punishment is מִיתָה but not מָמוֹן. Apparently in that case רַבִּי מֵאִיר does hold of קָם לֵיה בְּדְרָבָּה מִינֵיה.

The Gemara continues: וְכִי תֵּימָא: רַבִּי מֵאִיר, לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם — אִית לֵיהּ, מֵת וּמְשַׁלֵּם — לֵית לֵיהּ, וְלָא

Rabbi Stern points out here that normally when the Gemara uses the expression “וְכִי תֵּימָא”, which means “and perhaps you will say”, indicates that we’re going to suggest a resolution to a conflict and then reject it. But in this instance, it will אֵין הֶכָא נַמֵי be a teretz. And the key to the dual position of רַבִּי מֵאִיר is that, according to Reb Chaim Brisker, is that there are two sources for קָם לֵיה בְּדְרָבָּה מִינֵיה:

Reb Chaim Brisker (Reb Chaim Soloveitchik from Brisk)
  1. מִשּׁוּם רִשְׁעָה אַחַת אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ, וְאִי אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ מִשּׁוּם שְׁתֵּי רִשְׁעָיוֹת. וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ ״אַרְבָּעִים יַכֶּנּוּ״
  2. וְכִֽי־יִנָּצ֣וּ אֲנָשִׁ֗ים וְנָ֨גְפ֜וּ אִשָּׁ֤ה הָרָה֙ וְיָצְא֣וּ יְלָדֶ֔יהָ וְלֹ֥א יִהְיֶ֖ה אָס֑וֹן עָנ֣וֹשׁ יֵעָנֵ֗שׁ

The first source is for מַלְקוֹת and מָמוֹן and the second source is for מִיתָה and מָמוֹן. So according to רַבִּי מֵאִיר, Reb Chaim Brisker says, there are two different חִיוּבִים here. For מַלְקוֹת and מָמוֹן you don’t say קָם לֵיה בְּדְרָבָּה מִינֵיה and the perpetrator (the brother) receives both punishments, but for מִיתָה and מָמוֹן you do say קָם לֵיה and therefore the perpetrator (the father) receives only the more severe punishment which is death.

And then the Gemara tries to rebut that proof, that for מִיתָה and מָמוֹן you do say קָם לֵיה:

וְהָתַנְיָא: גָּנַב וְטָבַח בְּשַׁבָּת, גָּנַב וְטָבַח לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, גָּנַב שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל וּטְבָחוֹ — מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין

But isn’t it taught in a baraisa: If one stole an animal and slaughtered it on Shabbos, or stole it and slaughtered it for idolatry, or stole an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, from which one may derive no benefit and is therefore worthless, and slaughtered it, he pays the owner a payment of four or five times the principal, as he would in any case of stealing and slaughtering an animal? This is the statement of רַבִּי מֵאִיר, but the חֲכָמִים exempt him from payment because he is liable to receive the death penalty for slaughtering on Shabbat or for idolatry. So apparently, רַבִּי מֵאִיר does not hold for מִיתָה and מָמוֹן you say קָם לֵיה!

The Gemara in fact refutes this by saying that in the baraisa above the פְּטִירָה or exemption from payment according to the חֲכָמִים wasn’t due to קָם לֵיה. It was due to the fact that it wasn’t the thief himself who slaughtered the animal, but a שָׁלִיח, an agent:

הָא אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ: אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, רַבִּי אָבִין וְרַבִּי אִילְעָא וְכֹל חֲבוּרָתָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמְרִי: בְּטוֹבֵחַ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר

So I am חַיָב because I directed someone else to slaughter, but I didn’t to it myself. Consequently I can’t be מְחוּיָב for מִיתָה because I didn’t kill, but I am obligated for מָמוֹן. This is one of three instances in which an exception to the rule of אֵין שָׁלִיח לִדְבַר עַבֵירָה applies. Those three instances are:

a) מְעִילָה – if you are מוֹעֵל by הֶקְדֵשׁ

b) שְׁלִיחוּת יַד by פִּיקָדוֹן (uses something that he was entrusted to watch)

c) Our case of directing someone to violate in dalet va’hay (מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה)

Now we’re going to go deep into the weeds exploring what constitutes a viable שְׁחִיטָה, nuances in violating the laws of Shabbos, and a three way מַחְלוֹקֶת between רַבִּי מֵאִיר, the חַכָמִים, and רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר. That’s beyond my pay grade, so for the latter half of today’s Daf I turn you over to Rabbi Stern.

About Leonard J. Press, O.D., FAAO, FCOVD

Developmental Optometry is my passion as well as occupation. Blogging allows me to share thoughts in a unique visual style.
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