We begin on דף נ״ז עמוּד א, returning to the issue of אוֹנָאָה:
אָמַר רָבָא: אָמַר רַב חַסָּא, בָּעֵי רַבִּי אַמֵּי: אוֹנָאָה אֵין לָהֶם, בִּיטּוּל מִקָּח יֵשׁ לָהֶם אוֹ אֵין לָהֶן? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲדַר אָמַר רַב חַסָּא, פָּשֵׁיט רַבִּי אַמֵּי: אוֹנָאָה אֵין לָהֶם, בִּיטּוּל מִקָּח יֵשׁ לָהֶם. רַבִּי יוֹנָה אָמַר אַהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת, רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אָמַר אַקַּרְקָעוֹת, וְתַרְוַיְיהוּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמְרוּ: אוֹנָאָה אֵין לָהֶם, בִּיטּוּל מִקָּח יֵשׁ לָהֶן
רָבָא said in the name of רַב חַסָּא that רַבִּי אַמֵּי raises a question regarding those matters that are not subject to the halachos of אוֹנָאָה. Specifically, when the price disparity is greater than one-sixth, is the sale subject to nullification of the transaction [בִּיטּוּל מִקָּח]? רַב נַחְמָן said that רַב חַסָּא related on behalf of רַבִּי אַמֵּי that the items are not subject to אוֹנָאָה but they are subject to בִּיטּוּל מִקָּח. There seems to be no shortage of opinions here. רַבִּי יוֹנָה said that this ruling applies to הֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת (consecrated property). רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה said it applies to קַרְקַע. And both said in the name of רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן that the sale is not subject to אוֹנָאָה, but is subject to בִּיטּוּל מִקָּח.
Let’s take a look at what ArtScroll has to say about בִּיטּוּל מִקָּח:
The Gemara frequently uses אוֹנָאָה to mean an overcharge or underpayment of precisely one-sixth. An overcharge or underpayment of more than that is called בִּיטּוּל מִקָּח. But רַבִּי אַמֵּי poses this question: Perhaps אוֹנָאָה in the Torah refers only to a priced discrepancy that can be attributed to a faulty estimate, but if the discrepancy is more than one-sixth – and thus beyond the normal error range – the transaction is a מֶקַח טָעוֹת. If so, the even something excluded from אוֹנָאָה, such as קַרְקַע or one of the other items listed in our Mishnah, is subject to the law of בִּיטּוּל מִקָּח.
There is a counter-argument, however. Perhaps a sale is not considered “mistaken” unless someone was deceived about the nature of the merchandise (it was misrepresented by the seller) or about the amount being sold. However, if someone overcharges (or underpays) more than one-sixth for an item, and the nature of the item was not misrepresented, this is considered אוֹנָאָה. According to that line of reasoning, when the Torah excludes certain items from the laws of אוֹנָאָה, it means that the aggrieved party has no claim.
I find it interesting in our scenario that Rashi defines ביטול מקח specifically as “יותר משתות”, or price gouging, rather than less than one-sixth. You can see how this would fit well with קַרְקַע. We know that when there is “hot” real estate property, it isn’t uncommon for potential buyers to try an outbid one another so that the price becomes inflated compared to what one might think the land is worth. That is not price gouging or misrepresentation, because potential buyers knowingly engage in this bidding war. It’s a grayer area when קַרְקַע is sold for less than one-sixth of the asking price, in which case it would be uncertain if the house was listed at an unrealistic price to begin with, or if the seller is in desperate straits at the time, or there were some other mitigating factors that drove the price down more than one-sixth of the going rate.
The Gemara continues:
מַאן דְּאָמַר אַהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת, כל שֶׁכֵּן אַקַּרְקָעוֹת. מַאן דְּאָמַר אַקַּרְקָעוֹת, אֲבָל אַהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת לָא. כְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֶקְדֵּשׁ שָׁוֶה מָנֶה שֶׁחִילְּלוֹ עַל שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה – מְחוּלָּל
According to the one who states that this ruling applies to הֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת, all the more so that it should apply to קַרְקַע. But the one who states that this ruling applies to קַרְקַע states it only with regard to קַרְקַע, and not to הֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת. This is in accordance with the opinion of שְׁמוּאֵל who says that something which is הֶקְדֵּשׁ that is worth one hundred dinars that one desacralized [חִילְּלוֹ] upon a coin worth one peruta, is מְחוּלָּל. Since קַרְקַע that is הֶקְדֵּשׁ is not subject to the halachos of אוֹנָאָה at all, it is מְחוּלָּל upon coins worth any sum.
It is interesting, but not surprising to note this position of רַב חִסְדָא that הֶקְדֵּשׁ is in a category by itself as compared to regular marketplace dealings. As Steinsaltz points out, when laymen engage in transactions, we can say that one party might waive a disparity less than one-sixth. In the vernacular, we might refer to this conscious decision as the cost of doing business. But when it comes to הֶקְדֵּשׁ, there is no such concept. The Temple treasurer [גִּזְבָּרִ] is a clerk who is coordinating the transfer, and is not empowered to negotiate price. In other words when הֶקְדֵּשׁ is involved, there is no wiggle room for the cost of doing business.
The Gemara then proceeds to discuss what is tantamount to the futures market:
אָמַר רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּיבֵּל עָלָיו לְסַפֵּק סְלָתוֹת מֵאַרְבַּע, וְעָמְדוּ מִשָּׁלֹשׁ. כִּדְתַנְיָא: הַמְקַבֵּל עָלָיו לְסַפֵּק סְלָתוֹת מֵאַרְבַּע וְעָמְדוּ מִשָּׁלֹשׁ – מְסַפֵּק מֵאַרְבַּע; מִשָּׁלֹשׁ וְעָמְדוּ מֵאַרְבַּע – מְסַפֵּק מֵאַרְבַּע, שֶׁיַּד הֶקְדֵּשׁ עַל הָעֶלְיוֹנָה
רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא said we’re dealing with a case where one committed to supply fine flour to the בֵּית הַמִקְדָשׁ at the price of four se’a for a sela, and the market price rose and stood at three se’a for a sela. In that event he is required to fulfill his commitment and supply fine flour at four se’a for a sela. If one committed to supply fine flour at three se’a for a sela, and the market price decreased until it stood at four se’a for a sela, he must supply fine flour at four se’a for a sela. This is a form of רִיבִּית (interest), as the result is that the treasury of the בֵּית הַמִקְדָשׁ is at an advantage. Although an arrangement of that kind is prohibited in transactions involving laymen, in dealings of the בֵּית הַמִקְדָשׁ treasury it is permitted.
רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: הָכָא בְּאַבְנֵי בִנְיָן הַמְּסוּרוֹת לְגִזְבָּר עָסְקִינַן, כְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בּוֹנִין בַּחוֹל, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מַקְדִּישִׁין
רַב פָּפָּא said that there is a less complicated case of רִיבִּית involving הֶקְדֵּשׁ, namely – building stones that are entrusted to the גִזְבָּר, in accordance with the opinion of שְׁמוּאֵל who says: One builds the structures in the בֵּית הַמִקְדָשׁ with חִילוּל to avoid mis-use of הֶקְדֵשׁ during construction, and one converts those materials into הֶקְדֵשׁ thereafter. The גִזְבָּר has provisional possession of property that will ultimately belong to the treasury of the בֵּית הַמִקְדָשׁ. The stones are חִילוּל and can be loaned to others, but nevertheless are not subject to the halachos of רִיבִּית.
The Gemara turns next to an extended discussion of כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל. But that’s a really big sugya, and we’ve already covered a substantial amount of ground. So I’ll leave the balance at this juncture to Rabbi Stern.
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