From the News Center at UC Santa Cruz: “In his new book, Cosmological Koans: A Journey to the Heart of Physical Reality”, physicist Anthony Aguirre explores deep questions about the nature of reality, using an approach inspired by Zen koans to take the reader on a thought-provoking tour of the cosmos and the core ideas of modern physics.
In Zen Buddhism, koans are short parables or questions meant to confront the practitioner with the inadequacy of conventional concepts and habits of thought. Similarly, Aguirre’s “cosmological koans” confront the reader with the unexpected nature of the world as described by physics and the mind-boggling ways in which it differs from our subjective experience or intuitive understanding of things.
‘I wanted to convey that sense of mystery and wonder that comes from seeing reality in a new way,’ said Aguirre, a professor of physics and holder of the Faggin Family Presidential Chair for the Physics of Information at UC Santa Cruz.
The book covers a wide range of topics, woven together with a fictional story line that recounts a journey from Italy to Japan. Multiple universes, the nature of time, the meaning of quantum theory, and entropy and information are among the subjects explored in short chapters that manage to convey mind-bending ideas in a way that is accessible and entertaining.
The topics include some of the most challenging open questions in cosmology and physics, as well as concepts that have long been settled science yet remain disturbingly counterintuitive. With respect to the enduring mystery of time, for example, Einstein showed that there is no universal ‘now’—in other words, different observers can have different perceptions of whether two events are simultaneous.”
Let’s explore the concept of time a bit further. In Chapter 28, p. 210, Professor Aguirre writes that you don’t see the world as it is now, whether that “now” is cosmic or not. The world you see around you is the world as it was in the past. Viewing the leaf falling from a tree 50 meters away, you see the tree as it was 167 nanoseconds ago.
What does “now” mean? In other words how do we define the present as distinct from the past or the future? It’s a timeless question borne of metaphysics as much as physics. As soon as you stop to identify that now is now, the moment has already passed into the past. Perhaps the closest we can come is envisioning a pause button as the label for a given “time t” that occurs as an event in a particular space at a specific time. But as we know, within our physical framework, there is no pause button. The arrow of time is always moving forward. The instant we reflect on the present it becomes the past, and the future is the next moment in time.
So if identifying the present is nearly a fleeting impossibility, would we have the audacity to imagine a perfect moment in time? Art Garfunkel believes we can, and who am I to disagree?
In chapter 30, p. 226, Professor Aguirre turns his attention to the thorny question of Theodicy, or why a designer would create a world of beauty such as ours while allowing for unimaginable levels of pervasive suffering. This leads the good professor to contemplate the multiverse, and that the universe we inhabit is one among many – merely the one that is most inhabitable to us. That thinking is in line with Leibniz, who imagined this to be the “best” universe not just in terms of good outweighing evil, but also as the simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena.
Chapter 31, The Floating Gardens, prompted me to get even more whimsical than usual. From a biblical standpoint, and the Old Testament in particular, the most significant “uni-verse” is the first verse. (Might we consider this a Cosmological “Cohen” as opposed to a “Koan”?) It reads: בְּרֵאשִׁית בָּרָא אֱלֹהִים אֵת הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֵת הָאָרֶץ
בְּרֵאשִׁית – in the beginning. The beginning of what? Time would seem to be the essence.
בָּרָא אֱלֹהִים – God created. The apparent conflict between “God” in the plural, and “created” in the singular.
אֵת הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֵת הָאָרֶץ – The heavens and the earth. Note the singularity of the earth and the multiplicity of the heavens, not to mention “the two aces”.
So by now you may be wondering, who is Katrina? In chapter 50, p. 355, Professor Aguirre takes note of the host of dichotomies he has assailed us with: Us and Them. Self and Other. East and West. Katrina is a young woman in the service industry I encounter in her role as a barista at Starbucks in the morning and as a waitress at Martell’s Tiki Bar in the evening, a dichotomy in its own right. She took an interest in what I was reading one morning – it was Cosmological Koans – which led to a conversation about East/West and the Yoga which got shoved down to the bottom of my bucket list.
Starbucks of course asks for your first name if you order anything but regular coffee. Originally I gave my name as Len, but for some reason the baristas kept hearing “Glen”. I got tired of correcting them, and so Glen I became for the purposes of my morning routine. When Katrina waited on Miriam and me and at Martell’s, my “real” name came to the surface. “If you’re Len, be Len” she said. Sounds like a cosmological koan to me.
A person may lend them a quantity of wheat with which to seed the field, and at harvest time the sharecropper will add the amount of grain that he borrowed to the landowner’s portion of the yield. But he may not lend wheat for the sharecroppers to eat and be paid back with an equivalent quantity because this creates a concern about רִבִּית, as the price of wheat may rise. רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל would lend wheat to his sharecroppers in exchange for wheat, for purposes of seeding, and if he lent it at a high price and the price then fell, or if he lent it at an inexpensive price and the price subsequently rose, in all cases he would take it back from them at the inexpensive price. But this was not because this is the halacha; rather, he wanted to be מַחְמִיר with himself.
A person may lend wheat to his sharecroppers in exchange for wheat, for the purpose of seeding. In what case is this statement said? It is said when the sharecropper has not yet gone down into the field to begin to work, but if he had already gone down into the field to begin to work, lending him wheat under these terms is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is different about the tanna of our Mishnah, who does not differentiate between whether the sharecropper went down or did not go down, and what is different about the tanna of the baraisa, who does differentiate between whether he went down or he did not go down?
רָבָא said that רַבִּי אִידִי explained the matter to him as follows: In the locale of the tanna of our mishna, the local custom was that the sharecropper would provide the seeds, and therefore, whether he went down or did not go down, as long as the sharecropper has not put the seeds into the field the landowner can remove him from the field. Consequently, in a case where the landowner gives the sharecropper the seeds, he sets the terms of the sharecropping tenancy, and when the sharecropper goes down into the field, he goes down into the field for less than this, under the agreement that he will reduce his share of the crop in order to return the seed to the landowner.
By contrast, in the locale of the tanna of the baraisa, the landowner is the one who would provide the seeds, so if he has not yet gone down into the field [לֹא יָרַד] the landowner can remove him, and therefore, when he goes down into the field, he goes down for less than this. But if he went down [יָרַד], and therefore the landowner can no longer remove him, lending him wheat under these terms is אָסוּר, because he took upon himself in advance to work the field without receiving seeds from the owner of the field. Consequently, these seeds that he then receives are like a loan and the prohibition of רִבִּית applies.
Consider this scenario. A person says to his friend:
Lend me a kor of wheat, and the lender may set a price for him, stating that the borrower must repay the wheat in the future according to the value of wheat at the time of the loan. If, by the time the borrower must repay the loan, the wheat depreciates in value, he gives the lender a quantity of wheat equivalent to what he borrowed, and if it appreciates, he gives the value of the wheat he borrowed as per the market rate when he borrowed it, as agreed, but no more.
The Gemara questions this ruling: If the price of wheat depreciates, why should it be permitted for the borrower to pay him with wheat worth less than the value of the amount he borrowed? But he fixed a price at the time of the loan, and therefore the borrower owes him this amount of money. רַב שֵׁשֶׁת said: This is what the tanna is saying: If the lender did not set a price but merely lent him wheat, and it depreciates in value, the lender takes his wheat, as they did not agree that the borrower must repay the wheat according to its value at the time that the loan was taken out. But if it appreciates in value, the borrower gives the value of the wheat he borrowed as per the market rate when he borrowed it, in order to avoid the payment of רִבִּית.
A person may not say to another: Lend me a kor of wheat and I will give it back to you at the time the wheat is brought to the granary. Since wheat may increase in value, when he gives him back a kor of wheat at the time the wheat is brought to the granary it is worth more than the value of the loan, and he therefore will have paid רִבִּית. But he may say to him: Lend me a kor of wheat for a short period of time, for example, “until my son comes” or “until I find the key”, as there is no concern about a change in price during such a short interval of time. (As Rabbi Stern notes, this is a fancy of saying “יֵשׁ לוֹ”). הִלֵּל prohibits the practice even in this case. And הִלֵּל would similarly say that a woman may not lend a loaf of bread to another unless she establishes its monetary value. This is in order to avoid a situation where the wheat appreciates in value before she returns it, and they will therefore have come to be עוֹבֵר the לַאו of רִבִּית.
One who has a סְאָה of an item in his house may borrow a se’a of that item. Since he has available a se’a that he could give back right away, he may borrow one סְאָה, and similarly, if he has two סְאָה available he may borrow two סְאָה. However רַבִּי יִצְחָק says: Even if he has only one סְאָה, he may borrow several kor in reliance upon it. Since he can repay part of the loan immediately, and as the market value has yet to change there is only a concern about future interest, this concern is mitigated when it does not apply to the entire loan.
The Gemara comments: רַבִּי חִיָּיא teaches a baraisa in support of רַבִּי יִצְחָק’s ruling: If one does not have a drop of wine or if he does not have a drop of oil, he may not borrow wine or oil. Consequently, by inference it can be derived: If he does have a drop of wine or oil, he may borrow many drops in reliance upon it, as the tanna is certainly not referring to a case where he borrows just a few drops.
The Mishnah teaches: And הִלֵּל prohibits this practice. רַב נַחְמָן says that שְׁמוּאֵל says: The halaha is in accordance with the statement of הִלֵּל. The Gemara comments: But the halacha is not, in fact, in accordance with שְׁמוּאֵל.
Hillel would similarly say: A woman may not lend even a loaf of bread due to concern that she will violate the prohibition of interest. רַב יְהוּדָה said in the name of שְׁמוּאֵל: This is the statement of הִלֵּל, but the חֲכָמִים say that one may borrow various types of foods without specification [סְתַּם] and repay them סְתַּם. If neighbors are not particular with one another about these items, there is no concern about רִבִּית, in contrast to הִלֵּל’s opinion.
And רַב יְהוּדָה says in the name of שְׁמוּאֵל: With regard to the members of a group of people [בְּנֵי חֲבוּרָה] that eat together who are particular with each other and insist that each pay for precisely what he ate [הַמַּקְפִּידִין זֶה עַל זֶה], if they dine together on שַׁבָּת, they transgress a prohibition with regard to the strictures of measure [מִדָּה], and with regard to the strictures of weight [מִשְׁקָל], and with regard to the strictures of counting [מִנְיָן], all of which are calculations that are forbidden on שַׁבָּת. And they transgress a prohibition with regard to lending and repaying on יוֹם טוֹב, and according to the statement of הִלֵּל, they are also עוֹבֵר the לַאו of רִבִּית.
And רַב יְהוּדָה further says in the name of שְׁמוּאֵל: It is permitted for תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים to borrow from one another with רִבִּית, because they’re fully aware that רִבִּית is prohibited, and therefore they do not intend the loan to be a formal business transaction. They willingly forgo the additional payments to each other at the outset, and the extra payment is a gift that they give one another. The Gemara relates: שְׁמוּאֵל said to אֲבוּהּ בַּר אִיהִי: Lend me one hundred peppers in exchange for 120 peppers that I will give you at a later date. And you should know that this matter is fitting and appropriate, as I intend that the additional twenty peppers be a gift.
Similarly, רַב יְהוּדָה said in the name of רַב: It is permitted for a person to lend to his sons and the members of his household with רִבִּית for educational purposes – to experience how hard it is to repay it, which will discourage them from ever borrowing with interest again. As Rashi notes: שידעו כמה מצטער ומיצר הנותנו ויבינו כמה עונשו גדול. The Gemara comments: But this is not correct, because the members of his household may become corrupted by doing so and act similarly with others in cases when there is no justification for such behavior.
At this juncture Rabbi Stern interjects יורה דעה סימן ק״ס הלכות רבית סעיף י״ז:
תלמידי חכמים שהלוו זה את זה דברים של מאכל ונתן לו יותר על מה שלוה ממנו עד חומש ה”ז מותר שהדבר ידוע שלא נתן לו אלא מתנה: הגה ויש מתירין אפילו בהתנו מתחילה כך ובלבד בדבר מועט (הגהות אשיר”י וכ”מ דעת הטור וכ”נ דעת הרב המגיד) ומכל מקום לא ירגילו תלמידי חכמים עצמם בכך מפני המון העם שלא ילמדו מהם (הגהת מיי’ פ”ד מהל’ מלוה וסמ”ג לאוין קצ”ג)
A person may say to another: Weed the wild growths from my field with me now, and I will weed your field with you at a later stage, or: Till my field with me today and I will till with you on a different day. But he may not say to him: Weed with me today and I will till with you a different day, or: Till with me today and I will weed with you, as due to the different nature of the tasks it is possible that one of them will have to work harder than the other did, which is a type of רִבִּית, since he repaid him with additional labor.
Well there’s considerably more ground to cover for which you can follow along with Rabbi Stern’s video, but I just wanted to say: “Live From New York, It’s Saturday Night!” Just kidding of course, I really just wanted to say:
רָבָא said: In the case of these three people who gave money to one individual in order for him to act as a שָׁליחַ and purchase an item for them, and he purchased the item for only one of them, he has actually purchased it for all of them. (As in the Three Musketeers, “All for one and one for all”.) All three share ownership of that which was purchased, and the one for whom the item was purchased does not have any additional claim on the merchandise. And we said this ruling only when the שָׁליחַ did not wrap up and seal each person’s money separately but rather put all of the money in one bundle. But if he wrapped up and sealed each person’s money separately and spent the money of only one, then he purchased the item only for that person and not for those for whose sealed money he didn’t use.
רַב פַּפִּי said in the name of רָבָא: In this case of labeling an item with a marker or distinctive seal, which was commonly used to indicate that specific merchandise had been sold, even though the buyer had not yet paid and the item was still located in the seller’s warehouse, the labeling effects קִנְיָן for the buyer. רַב חֲבִיבָא says the chidush here is that this is a fully executed קִנְיָן even though it did not physically come into his possession yet. As Rashi explains, סִיטוּמְתָּא is: חותם שרושמין החנונים על החביות של יין שלוקחין הרבה ביחד ומניחין אותו באוצר הבעלים ומוליכין אותן אחת אחת למכור לחנות ורושמין אותם לדעת שכל הרשומות נמכרות
The רַבָּנַן said that the קִנְיָן goes into effect only concerning a case where one of the parties withdraws from the transaction and is required to accept upon himself the curse of “מִי שֶׁפָּרַע” (we learned this on Bava Metzia 44). Let’s take a look at this great elaboration on מִי שֶׁפָּרַע from Rabbi Ari Enkin at OU Torah.org:
“The Talmud teaches that one who reneges on his word, whether in business or in any other commitment, is worthy of the curse of “mi shepara.” The mi shepara curse is proclaimed as follows, “He who punished (“mi shepara”) the generation of the Flood, the Tower of Babel, S’dom and Amora, and the Egyptians by the sea will punish one who does not keep his word.” The mi shepara curse is considered to be especially serious and even drastic. Nevertheless, a Beit Din would not hesitate to pronounce the curse upon someone who unlawfully reneges on his word. In order to properly understand the significance of this curse, some background information is in order.”
You can take a look at Rabbi Enkin’s entire piece on מִי שֶׁפָּרַע here.
The Gemara concludes with the halacha that a סִיטוּמְתָּא effects קִנְיָן of the item only in that one who withdraws from the transaction is required to accept upon himself the מִי שֶׁפָּרַע curse. But in a place where the custom is that it actually effects the קִנְיָן, the halacha recognizes the legitimacy of the local custom.
At this juncture Rabbi Stern shared the halacha from: חושן משפט, הלכות מקח וממכר, סימן ר״א, which supports the conclusion we came to above regarding the סִיטוּמְתָּא resulting in a valid קִנְיָן:
דין רושם על החבית והתוקע כפו לחבירו. ובו ב”ס מכר לו בדברים בלבד ופסקו הדמים ורשם הלוקח רושם על המקח כדי שיהיה לו סימן ידוע שהוא שלו אע”פ שלא נתן לו מהדמים כלום כל החוזר בו אחר שרשם מקבל מי שפרע ואם מנהג המדינה הוא שיקנה הרושם קנין גמור נקנה המקח ואין אחד מהם יכול לחזור בו וחייב זה ליתן הדמים והוא שרשם בפני המוכר או שאמר ליה המוכר רשום מקחך
Onward in the Gemara, but as a preamble let’s briefly review the three types of exchanges that signify the transaction has been made [סִימָנִים]:
The Mishnah teaches that if the seller was first among the reapers [קּוֹצְרִים], he may set a price with the buyer only when the פֵּירוֹת he has are ready for delivery. רַב says: If only two of the actions above needed to complete the labor to prepare the פֵּירוֹת were lacking, he may set a price, as the פֵּירוֹת are viewed as if they had already been prepared. But if all three actions were lacking, he may not set a price, as the item is still not considered prepared, and the setting of a price in advance creates a concern of רִבִּית. And שְׁמוּאֵל says: If the actions needed to complete the labor are to be performed בִּידֵי אָדָם then even if one hundred actions were lacking, he may set a price, but if the necessary actions must be accomplished בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם, then even if one action is lacking, he may not set a price.
Well, רַב and שְׁמוּאֵל unsurprisingly butt heads on the implications of this over several cases, and I’ll leave the balance of the Daf to Rabbi Stern’s video to complete since I’m a bit “under the weather”.
Let’s begin at the bottom of דף ע״ב עמוּד ב with what Rabbi Stern describes as the Daf’s version of the Teamsters. Once again, we’re going through various scenarios to determine what is permissible in business dealings, as opposed to what it forbidden because it constitutes a הַלְוָאָה with רִבִּית (whether or not the intent was to structure it that way). The cases we’re discussing aren’t conventional “loans” of money provided to a borrower that is repaid after a period of time with interest.
An overarching principle here is “סָאָה בְּסָאָה” (a bushel for a bushel), the loan of a commodity which calls for repayment of the same amount. The רַבָּנָן prohibited such loans due to concern that the price of the commodity might increase in the interim, and the payback would therefore constitute רִבִּית. This is true even if it is the provision of merchandise on credit, as was done back in the day through bartering or deferred payment (I’ll take merchandise, and when I sell it for a profit it I’ll give back the original merchandise in kind or its value.)
Someone transports a package of goods from one place, where he bought it inexpensively, to another place, where the price is higher, in order to sell it at a profit. Someone else finds him on the way and says: “Give me the package, and I will pay you in the manner that they pay you in that place to which you are going”.
If the package remains in the possession of the seller (the seller accepts responsibility for any accidental damage that occurs along the way), it is מוּתָּר, as the transaction is not a loan. But if it is in the possession of the buyer (the buyer accepts responsibility for accidental damage), then the transaction is אָסוּר, as it is considered a הַלְוָאָה with רִבִּית.
With regard to one who transports פֵּירוֹת from one place to another, if someone says to him: “Give me the פֵּירוֹת now and I’ll repay you with פֵּירוֹת that I have in the place where you’re going”, if he actually has פֵּירוֹת there it’s permitted, but if not, it’s prohibited. Donkey drivers who transport merchandise from one place to another may accept money and set prices in a place where goods are sold at expensive prices according to the rate in effect in another place (where goods are sold at inexpensive prices), and need not be concerned, as this is מוּתָּר.
רַב פָּפָּא says this practice is permitted because it is satisfactory to sell merchandise at a discounted rate. In doing so the gates to the new market are opened for the donkey drivers, as they begin to do business in this area and gain new customers. רַב אַחָא, the son of רַב אִיקָא, said: It is satisfactory to them because the prices are reduced for them in the places where they make purchases. Since the sellers there hear that the donkey drivers will need to resell the merchandise at a lower price, they give a discount to the donkey drivers. According to either opinion, the donkey drivers provide the additional פֵּירוֹת to the customer not as רִבִּית on the הַלְוָאָה but as a discount to promote their business.
The Gemara asks: What’s the difference between these two reasons to allow this practice? The difference is the impact it has on a merchant who’s new to the area. According to the one who holds that he may sell the פֵּירוֹת in order to open a new market for him, it applies specifically to a merchant in this situation. But according to the one who holds that the reason is that he can procure his merchandise inexpensively, the sellers will not believe him if he is new, and they will not sell it to him at a discount. As Rashi notes: תגר שאינו ניכר עדיין למאן דאמר דמגלו להו תרעא איכא למ”ד דמוזלי גבייהו ליכא דכיון שאינו ניכר להם אין מאמינים בדבריו שהוא נותנם במקומו בזול ולא מוזלי גביה
A note here about the geography that follows. סוּרָא (Sura) was a large center of commerce that was also the seat of the Yeshiva in בָּבֶל of the Academy of רַב. At that time it was located on the border of what is now Iran and Iraq. Steinsaltz notes that כַּפְרִי (Kafri) was a city near סוּרָא that in earlier generations was an important Jewish center, but as סוּרָא grew its cultural influence waned and it served primarily as an agricultural center serving the surrounding area. With that background …
In סוּרָא, four סְאָה of wheat were going for a sela, and in the nearby town of כַּפְרִי they were going for six סְאָה for a sela. Rav gave money to donkey drivers to purchase wheat in כַּפְרִי and accepted upon himself responsibility for any accident that might happen on the way, rendering it permitted for him to set a price according to the rate in effect in כַּפְרִי, and he accepted five סְאָה of wheat for one sela from them. The Gemara challenges: Since he accepted responsibility for damage that might occur as a result of an accident, the produce was his at the time it was purchased, and therefore there was no loan. Consequently, he should have accepted six סְאָה for a sela. The Gemara explains: An important person [אָדָם חָשׁוּב] is different, as he has to be more stringent with himself and more careful to avoid the appearance of רִבִּית (an interesting insight into reputation management).
רַבִּי אַסִּי asked רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: What is the halacha about doing so with metal scraps [גְרוּטָאוֹת]? Is it permitted to make an agreement to purchase metal scraps at the low rate in effect elsewhere, just as it is permitted with wheat and other produce? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן replied: רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי wanted to do so with linen garments [כְּלֵי פִּשְׁתָּן] and רַבִּי did not allow him to do so. [There are those who say it happened in the inverse: רַבִּי wanted to do so with metal scraps, and רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי did not permit him to do so.]
With regard to one who wants to purchase the פֵּירוֹת of an entire orchard [פַּרְדֵּיסָא], in advance of the harvest, at a cheaper price, רַב prohibits this and שְׁמוּאֵל permits it. The Gemara explains: רַב prohibits it because in the future the פֵּירוֹת will be worth more, so it appears that the seller is paying רִבִּית to the buyer for waiting before receiving the produce. שְׁמוּאֵל permits it since there can be spoilage in the פֵּירוֹת of the orchard and the buyer took upon himself responsibility for any losses, it does not appear that the seller is paying רִבִּית to the buyer for waiting before receiving the produce, as the buyer may either gain or lose.
רַב שִׁימִי בַּר חִיָּיא said: רַב concedes that an arrangement like this would be permitted in a case where one arranges to purchase young oxen at a later date, as their loss is likely to be great. Since it is common for one to incur a discernible loss when raising oxen, as some may die, this arrangement is regarded as an investment. As Rashi notes: מקום שבוצרין כרמים בשוורים בעגלה ומוליכין את העגלה בין שורות הכרמים ומתקלקלין רגלי השוורים בקלחי שרשים שבקרקע והפסדן רב
שְׁמוּאֵל said to those who purchase branches of grapevines and pay in advance for the vine shoots that will be harvested later: Since the risk in this transaction is small, it is אַבַק רִבִּית and therefore you should perform some labor in farming the orchard so that you acquire some of the land for yourselves. In doing so you become partners with the owner in the branches (literally), rather than having the appearance of a loan with interest in violation of סָאָה בְּסָאָה.
Similarly, רָבָא said to those who guard fields until the harvest is complete and receive their wages from the crops when the harvest is over: “Go out and turn over some of the crops in the threshing floor, and thereby assist the owners in their work in order that the wages for your hire are not payable until that time. If you assist in the actual farming work, the halachic period of your employment will continue until the processing of the grain is complete.”
[לְהַלָכָה the obligation to pay a person’s wage is incurred only at the end of the period for which he was hired. It is then that the owners give the guards crops at a reduced rate. It is therefore not payment of רִבִּית for delaying the wages that they should have been paid earlier. As Rashi notes: סייעו את בני הבקעה בדישת התבואה בגורן בהולכה ובהבאה סיועא פורתא לפי שבשביל שאתם ממתינים שכרכם עד גמר מירוח הגורן הם נותנים לכם מתנה יותר על שכרכם לפיכך סייעו אותם כדי שתהא פעולתכם מושכת עד כלות הגורן ושכירות אינה משתלמת אלא לבסוף ואין כאן המתנה ואם יוסיפו לכם אין זה שכר המתנת שכרכם אלא אוזולי מוזלי לגבייכו.]
On a final note, משה יהודה בן הרב אליעזר שטארן points out that in the מַחְלוֹקֶת of רַב and שְׁמוּאֵל, we usually pasken like שְׁמוּאֵל regarding cases involving דִינֵי מָמוֹן and like רַב regarding דִינֵי אִיסוּר וְהֶיתֵּר. Here we pasken like רַב, even though you would think that רִבִּית would be categorized as דִינֵי מָמוֹן. This underscores the point that רִבִּית falls under the umbrella of דִינֵי אִיסוּר וְהֶיתֵּר in יורה דעה, because, as Rabbi Stern noted in his introduction to אֵיזֶהוּ נֶשֶׁךְ, of the insidious nature of רִבִּית (the comparison to a snake bit and its venomous consequences) and the emphasis that the Torah puts on safeguarding against it among Jews.
In the case of a Jew who borrowed money with רִבִּית from a נָכְרִי, and the נָכְרִי established the רִבִּית as a loan for the Jewish borrower, i.e., he added the amount of רִבִּית to the principal and consolidated it into a single debt, and then the נָכְרִי converted, the halacha depends on the circumstances.
If the נכְרִי established it as a loan for him before he converted, he may collect the principal from the borrower and he may also collect the רִבִּית. Since it had already been consolidated into a single debt, it’s as if he already collected the רִבִּית while he was still a נָכְרִי. However, if he established it as a loan after he converted, he may collect the principal but may not collect the רִבִּית, as it still had the status of רִבִּית when he became a Jew.
And similarly, consider the case of a נָכְרִי who borrowed money with רִבִּית from a Jew, and then converted. If the גֵר established it as a loan before he converted, the Jew may collect the principal and may also collect the רִבִּית. If he established it as a loan after he converted, he may collect the principal but may not collect רִבִּית, as the loan still had the status of רִבִּית at the time he became a Jew.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי says: If a נָכְרִי borrowed money with רִבִּית from a Jew and converted, whether in this circumstance or that circumstance (i.e., regardless of when the lender consolidated the רִבִּית and principal into a single debt), the Jewish lender may collect the principal and he may also collect the interest. רָבָא quotes רַב חִסְדָּא in the name of רַב הוּנָא as saying: The halacha is in accordance with the opinion of רַבִּי יוֹסֵי. And רָבָא asks: What is the reasoning behind the opinion of רַבִּי יוֹסֵי? (What is the justification for collecting רִבִּית from a Jew?) It is in order that people will not suspect that he converted in order to avoid paying the רִבִּית. (Editorial comment on my part here that given what’s involved in the process of going through a proper conversion, it seems superficial to say that people might suspect he did it for the ulterior motive of avoiding רִבִּית. The cavalier sense one gets reminds me of the joke by Alan King: An elderly Jew on his deathbed sent for a priest, after declaring to his astonished relatives that “I want to convert.” They asked him why he would become a Catholic after living all his life as a Jew, and he replied: “Better one of them should die than one of us.”)
In the case of a promissory note in which the details of a loan with רִבִּית were written, we penalize the lender, and therefore he may not collect the principal and may not collect רִבִּית. This is the statement of רַבִּי מֵאִיר. And the רַבָּנַן say: He may collect the principal but he may not collect רִבִּית. With regard to what principle do they disagree? רַבִּי מֵאִיר holds we penalize him with regard to something which is permitted, given his attempt to do something which is prohibited (collecting רִבִּית), and the רַבָּנַן hold that we do not penalize him.
We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Shevi’is 10:5): Pre-dated promissory notes, in which the date written in the document is earlier than the date the loan was actually transacted, are not valid, but postdated promissory notes are valid. The Gemara asks: Why are pre-dated documents not valid? Granted, they cannot be used to collect from the first date, the date written in them, because this could cause loss to people who purchased land from the borrower in the time between the date written on the promissory note and the time the loan was actually granted. The land they purchased would be subject to a lien when it fact it should not be. But at least they should be able to be used to collect from the second date, when the loan was actually granted.
[ArtScroll explains here that normally if a borrower defaults on a loan, the lender can go after properties that he sold while the loan was in effect. This is part of the lien process. But in a pre-dated promissory note, the lender is waiving his right to go after property that was sold by the borrower prior to the date that the loan goes into effect. As Rashi explains, רַבִּי מֵאִיר is concerned that the purchaser of the land from the borrower may not notice the fine print of the loan indicating it was pre-dated, and yield the property to a fraudulent lender who’s trying to pull a fast one by claiming the property as a lien.]
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ says: This mishna is subject to dispute, and it is taught in accordance with the opinion of רַבִּי מֵאִיר, who said that the lender is penalized with regard to that which is permitted due to do, because of his attempt to do that which is prohibited. Here too, since he wrote an incorrect date, the entire document is invalidated as a penalty. And רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן says: You may even say that this halacha is in accordance with the opinion of the רַבָּנַן, as here there is a rabbinic decree invalidating the document lest he collect from the first date. If the document is not invalidated, the lender will depend on it and will come to collect repayment according to the date written on it.
What comes next is what Rabbi Stern refers to as “Dueling Jews” (or one might say, a ruse among Jews):
There was a certain man who mortgaged his vineyard to another as security for a loan, and the lender consumed the פֵּירוֹת of the orchard for three years. At the end of this time the lender tried to force the the borrower to sell him the vineyard by threatening that if he doesn’t, the lender would hide the mortgage and say: “It is purchased, and that is why it is in my possession (meaning I will claim I purchased the field and lost the deed). Since the land has been in my possession for three years I do not have to bring any other proof, as the halacha is that after three years of use of a field there is a presumption of ownership for the one who uses it. As Rashi notes: ואבד שטר המכירה ואבא מכח חזקה של ג’ שנים דכולי האי לא מצינא למיזדהר בשטרא
[ArtScroll notes to the rescue here again. It seems on the surface that the lender would be shooting himself in the foot by hiding the promissory note, since by doing so he’d be unable to collect the debit. So presumably we’d have to say that the vineyard was worth more to the lender than the debt. That would leave the borrower powerless to prove that the lender’s claim is false.]
When the borrower saw that he could not protect himself against the ruse, he devised a scheme: He went and transferred ownership of the field to his son who was a קָטָן by means of a שְׁטַר מַתָּנָה, and afterward sold the field to the lender. Subsequently, he demanded that the sale be voided, since when he sold the field, it was not his (having gifted it to his minor son – almost like a tax shelter).
The sale was certainly not a sale, since the field was not his to sell, but the question is: Are the dinars that the buyer paid similar to a loan secured through a promissory note, and therefore the buyer can collect the money he paid even from liened property that has been sold? Or is it similar to a loan made by oral agreement without written documentation, and therefore he cannot collect from liened property. אַבַּיֵי said: Is this question not the same as that of רַבִּי אַסִּי?
רַבִּי אַסִּי said that in the case of a debtor who admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor is not required to ratify it in court in order to collect the debt. He can therefore use the document to collect the debt even from liened property that has been sold. In the present case as well, the seller admits that he received the money; therefore the document of sale should enable the buyer to collect his money from liened property.
רָבָא said to אַבַּיֵי: Hold on – are these cases comparable? There the document attests to events agreed upon by both parties, thereby permitting use the promissory note to collect the debt from liened property. But in our case extortion was involved, and the entire sale wasn’t valid since it was done against the will of the seller.
The Gemara continues its discussion about flaws in contract documentation:
מָרִימָר sat and stated this halacha. רָבִינָא said to מָרִימָר: But if רָבָא’s answer is accepted, then with regarding that which רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן said concerning a pre-dated loan document (that there is a rabbinic decree invalidating the שְׁטַר lest he collect from the first date), let us say that there is a better rationale, as רָבָא stated: The pre-dated שְׁטַר is invalid, as it may not be written. מָרִימָר said to him: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the pre-dated שְׁטַר, granted, it may not be written from the first date, but it may be written from the second date. Here (in the case of attempted extortion), the שְׁטַר may not be written at all.
Let’s venture into the next Mishnah, which re-visits the subject of futures contracts that we blogged about previously:
One may not set a price with a buyer for the future delivery of פֵּירוֹת until the market rate is publicized [עַד שֶׁיֵּצֵא הַשַּׁעַר], as, if he is paid for supplying פֵּירוֹת at a later date in advance of the publication of the market rate for that type of produce, he may set a price that is too low. The money paid in advance is deemed a הַלְוָאָה, and if the initial payment was lower than the later market value, delivery of the פֵּירוֹת will constitute רִבִּית on the הַלְוָאָה. Once the market rate is publicized, the seller may set a price, even if the פֵּירוֹת are not yet in his possession. The reason for this is that even though the seller does not have any of the פֵּירוֹת, someone else, has it and the seller could theoretically acquire the פֵּירוֹת now at the price he set.
If the seller was first among the reapers, having harvested his crop before the market rate was set, he may set a price with a buyer as he wishes for a stack of grain that is already in his possession, or for a large basket of grapes prepared for pressing into wine, or for a vat of olives prepared for pressing into oil, or for the clumps of clay prepared for use by a potter, or for plaster nearing the end of the manufacturing process at the point after he has sunk it, i.e., baked it, in the kiln. Although the market rate has yet to be set, the seller may nevertheless set a price now for their eventual delivery.
And he may set a price with a buyer for manure [זֶּבֶל] on any of the days of the year, as the manure will certainly be available and it is therefore viewed as if it is ready. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי says: One may set the price of manure only if he already had a pile of manure in his dunghill [אַשְׁפָּה] to which the sale can immediately be applied, but the חֲכָמִים permit it in all cases.
And one may also set a price with a buyer at the highest rate (a large amount of פֵּירוֹת sold for the lowest price), stipulating with the seller that the sale price match the lowest market rate for this product during the course of the year. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה says: Even if he did not set a price with him beforehand at the highest rate, the buyer may say to the seller: Give me the פֵּירוֹת at this rate or return my money. Since he did not formally acquire the פֵּירוֹת, if the price changed he may withdraw from the transaction.
The pasuk in מִשְׁלֵי states: “He who augments his substance [הוֹנוֹ] by interest [בְּנֶשֶׁךְ] and increase [וְתַרְבִּית], gathers it for him who has pity on the poor [לְחוֹנֵן דַּלִּים]” (Mishlei 28:8). The Gemara asks: What’s the meaning of the phrase “לְחוֹנֵן דַּלִּים”? In other words, how does this money ultimately reach someone who has pity on the poor? רַב said it’s referring to one such as King Shapur [שַׁבּוּר מַלְכָּא]. The money will ultimately reach the king, who provides for the poor from the possessions of the individual who lends with רִבִּית.
Rashi identifies שַׁבּוּר [Shapur] as a Persian king, as follows:
שבור מלכא – מלך פרס היה ונוטל ממון מישראל וחונן בהם דלים נכרים שהם דלים מן המצות
Steinsaltz elaborates that King Shapur I [241-272 CE] the second monarch in the Sasanian dynasty, was one of the great kings of Persia who fought the Romans many times and significantly expanded the borders of Syria. Unlike most of the kings of that dynasty, he was tolerant of other religions. Much has been told of his special closeness to the Jews, and how he respected the Jewish leaders and שְׁמוּאֵל in particular. Steinsaltz includes the image below of King Shapur I on a coin minted during his reign.
רַב נַחְמָן said that רַב הוּנָא that this pasuk (in Mishlei cited above) is necessary only to state that even רִבִּית that a Jew took from a גוֹי will ultimately reach the government treasury, and the one who took it will not be successful. רָבָא raised an objection to the statement of רַב נַחְמָן: The pasuk states: “לַנכְרִי תַשִּׁיךְ” (Devarim 23:21), which indicates that it is permitted for a Jew to take רִבִּית from a gentile, as what is the meaning of “תַשִּׁיךְ”? Doesn’t it mean the same as תִּשּׁוֹךְ, to take רִבִּית, thereby teaching that one may take רִבִּית from a gentile? The Gemara says no, it means to pay רִבִּית (meaning that you must pay him רִבִּית).
The Gemara asks: Is it not sufficient without this? [In other words, can the pasuk actually require Jews to borrow money from a גוֹי and to pay him רִבִּית? This can’t be the case.] The Gemara answers: It does not mean that borrowing money with רִבִּית is a mitzva. Rather, the pasuk mentions paying רִבִּית to a גוֹי in order to exclude אָחִיךָ, to teach that one may pay רִבִּית to a גוֹי but not to a Jew.
The Gemara challenges this explanation of the pasuk: The prohibition against paying רִבִּית to “אָחִיךָ” is explicit in the continuation of the same pasuk in Devarim: ״וּלְאָחִיךְ לֹא תַשִּׁיךְ״ Consequently, there is no need to learn this halacha from an inference. The Gemara responds that it’s necessary in order to teach that if one pays רִבִּית to a Jew he violates both:
the עֲשֵׂה to pay interest to a גוֹי (but not to a Jew), and
the לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה against paying רִבִּית to a Jew.
Please have a look at this phenomenal overview of the subject of interest on loans with non-Jews at Halachipedia.
רָבָא raised an objection to the statement of רַב נַחְמָן based on another difficulty in the mishna, which teaches: One may borrow money from them (non-Jews) and one may lend money to them and charge רִבִּית. Simlarly, with regard to a גֵר תּוֹשָׁב, one may borrow money from him and lend money to him with רִבִּית, since he is not a Jew. The mishna indicates this may be done l’chatchila. רַב חִיָּיא, the son of רַב הוּנָא, said: This ruling of the mishna is necessary only to teach that one may lend money with רִבִּית to a גֵר תּוֹשָׁב, only to the extent required to provide a livelihood to the lender, but not to do so as a regular business.
רָבִינָא said: Here in the mishna we’re dealing with תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים, for whom it is permitted to lend money to a גוֹי with רִבִּית. The reason the רַבָּנַן decreed that one should not lend money to a גוֹי with רִבִּית is because of a concern that continuous interactions with גוֹייִם in financial matters may have a negative influence on a Jew. That concern doesn’t apply to תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים.
The Gemara adds that there’s a “pecking order” in issuing loans:
There are those who teach that which רַב הוּנָא said (in connection with that which רַב יוֹסֵף taught): The pasuk states: אִם כֶּסֶף תַּלְוֶה אֶת עַמִּי אֶת הֶעָנִי עִמָּךְ [“If you lend money to any of My people, even to the poor person who is with you” – Shemos 22:24].
The term “עַמִּי” teaches that if one of My people, i.e., a Jew, and a גוֹי both come to borrow money from you, the Jew takes precedence.
The term “הֶעָנִי” teaches that if a poor person and a rich person come to borrow money, the poor person takes precedence.
And from the term: “עִמָּךְ” it is derived: If your poor person, meaning one of your relatives, and one of the poor of your city come to borrow money, your poor person takes precedence. If it is between one of the poor of your city and one of the poor of another city, the one of the poor of your city takes precedence.
It was taught that “If one of My people and a gentile come to you for a loan, My people take precedence”. The Gemara asks: Is there any reason to think that a גוֹי would take precedence over a Jew for loan approval? (The Chosen People should have perks, right?) רַב נַחְמָן said that רַב הוּנָא said to him: It is necessary only to teach that even if the choice is to lend money to a gentile with רִבִּית or to a Jew for interest-free (without רִבִּית), one must still give preference to the Jew and lend the money to him, even though this will entail a lack of profit.
[In passing, one of the Daf attendees mentioned Shakespeare, and Shylock was certainly a controversial figure. Rabbi Stern commented “yemach shemo“, but it is instructive to look at some of the literary criticism leveled at the characterization of the Jew as a money lender through Shylock.]
Rabbi Stern called our attention to a foundational Tosafos which begins with תשיך לא סגי דלאו הכי and states:
ומה שנהגו עתה להלוות לנכרים אור”ת משום דבשל סופרים הלך אחר המיקל וקי”ל כאידך לישנא דמתני הא דרב הונא אברייתא דרב יוסף ולא אסרו מעולם רב נחמן ורב הונא רבית דנכרי ואפי’ ללישנא קמא יש להתיר לפי שיש עלינו מס מלך ושרים והכל הוי כדי חיינו ועוד שאנו שרויין בין האומות ואי אפשר לנו להשתכר בשום דבר אם לא נישא וניתן עמהם הלכך אין לאסור רבית שמא ילמוד ממעשיו יותר משאר משא ומתן
This underscores the fact that in our times we interact with non-Jews regularly enough that the prohibition of charging רִבִּית to them in order to avoid co-mingling has become a moot point. As Rabbi Stern notes, another example of how nothing is etched in stone, and the רַבָּנָן adapted their guidelines to be consistent with the times.
לְהַלָכָה, Rabbi Stern points out סִימָן קנ״א סְעִיף א in שׁוּלְחָן עָרוּךְ יוֹרָה דֵעָה where the מְחַבֵּר writes:
שמותר להלוות לעובד כוכבים ולמומר ברבית. ובו ג’ סעיפים: דבר תורה מותר להלוות לעובד כוכבים ברבית וחכמים אסרוהו אם לא כדי חייו או לת”ח או ברבית דרבנן והאידנא מותר (בכל ענין) (הטור)
The Law declared it is permitted to lend to a non-Jews with רִבִּית, but the חַכָמִים prohibited it except if it is for one’s livelihood, or by תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים, or if it is only רִבִּית דְרַבָּנָן. And nowadays it is permitted- and the רמ״א adds parenthetically, in all matters.
And then we come to a piece of Gemara that highlights the extent to which מַלְוֵי בְּרִבִּית is frowned upon:
It is taught in a baraisa: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי says: Come and see the blindness in the eyes of those who lend money with interest. If a person calls another a רָשָׁע in public, the other becomes insulted and he harasses him in all aspects of his life because he called him by this disgraceful name. Rabbi Stern noted the Tosafos on this which states: כתוב בתשובות הגאונים בשם רב צדוק גאון יורד עמו לחייו רשאי לשרוף שליש תבואתו ותימה גדול מנין לו זה – that the severity of this public defamation was such that the defamed individual could take retribution by burning up to a third of the other person’s property in retribution (such was his justifeed outrage). But, the Gemara continues, even greater than this was the issue of lending with רִבִּית: Witnesses come with a scribe and pen and ink and write and sign a document that attests: “פְּלוֹנִי זֶה כָּפַר בֵּאלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל”. Wow – מַלְוֵי בְּרִבִּית is tantamount to anti-theism.
It is taught in a baraisa: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר says: Concerning anyone who has money and lends it without interest, the pasuk in Tehilim (15:5) says about him: “He who has not given his money with interest and who has not taken a bribe against the innocent, he who does these shall never collapse” (כַּסְפּוֹ לֹא נָתַן בְּנֶשֶׁךְ וְשֹׁחַד עַל נָקִי לֹא לָקָח עֹשֵׂה אֵלֶּה לֹא יִמּוֹט לְעוֹלָם).
At this juncture Rabbi Stern shared an אוֹר הַחַיִים on the following pasuk from Parshas Mishpatim (Shemos 22:24), אִם־כֶּ֣סֶף ׀ תַּלְוֶ֣ה אֶת־עַמִּ֗י אֶת־הֶֽעָנִי֙ עִמָּ֔ךְ לֹא־תִהְיֶ֥ה ל֖וֹ כְּנֹשֶׁ֑ה לֹֽא־תְשִׂימ֥וּן עָלָ֖יו נֶֽשֶׁךְ:
וזה הוא אומרו אם כסף תלוה את עמי פירוש אם ראית שהיה לך כסף יתר על מה שאתה צריך לעצמך שאתה מלוה לעמי תדע לך שאין זה חלק המגיעך אלא חלק אחרים שהוא העני עמך, ובזה רמז כי צריך לפתוח לו משלו. ואולי כי רמז לו גם כן שלא יתנשא ויתגדל על העני בראותו כי הוא הנותן לו, והוא אומרו לא תהיה לו כנושה לשון נשיאות ומעלה כי משלו הוא נותן לו. וחזר לומר כנגד ההלואה לא תשימון עליו וגו’
The bottom line is that interest-free loans signify your recognition that the money you have is by the grace of הקבּ״ה rather that being something you “own”, and is intended to be shared rather than hoarded.
Well we’ve passed the half-way point of this jam-packed Daf, and for the balance I leave you with Rabbi Stern’s video.
Due to the complexities involved in רִבִּית, as we continue to navigate the subject, I like to intersperse helpful overviews that complement our “regularly scheduled programming”, and here is a nice synopsis from the Denver Kollel.
We’re continuing with the concept of הֶיתֵּר עִיסְקָא, a halachically permissible way of structuring a loan so that it is technically a business investment rather than a הַלְוָאָה, and the prohibition of רִבִּית therefore does not apply. As one example, the Daf yesterday ended with the case where a sail was added to a ship to make it more desirable. The return on that investment is that more people will rent the ship and therefore all parties with a stake in the ship benefit.
Since the subject of a ship was raised, the Gemara mentions a related statement of רַב who said: For a ship, it is permitted to conduct a transaction where someone pays rent for the use of the ship and is also liable to pay for any damage caused to the ship. רַב כָּהֲנָא and רַב אַסִּי said to רַב: If he receives rent, then he should not receive payment for damage, and if he receives payment for damage, then he should not receive rent. That’s because if the ship is the responsibility of the renter, it is a הַלְוָאָה, and if he pays rent for such a הַלְוָאָה, it is רִבִּית (which we know is not permitted). רַב was silent, and it appeared that he couldn’t answer this question.
רַב שֵׁשֶׁת said: What is the reason that רַב was silent? Did he not hear that which is taught in a baraisa: Even though the חַכָמִים said that one may not accept a guaranteed investment [we previously discussed צֹאן בַּרְזֶל in Masesches Yevamos here] from a Jew, meaning one may not accept from a Jew animals to raise and receive one-half of the profits while also accepting full responsibility to pay the initial value of the animals in the event there is a loss (as this arrangement is deemed a הַלְוָאָה with רִבִּית), nevertheless one may accept a צֹאן בַּרְזֶל from gentiles, because there is no prohibition against paying them רִבִּית. Yet the חַכָמִים said: If one appraised a cow for another to raise and to divide the profits, and the one accepting the cow said to the cow’s owner: “Your cow is evaluated for me at thirty dinars if I do not return it to you, and I will pay you a sela per month for the use of it”, this is permitted, because he did not make it a matter of lending money.
The Gemara asks rhetorically: And did he not make it a matter of lending money? He most certainly did, as he obligated himself to pay for the cow if he does not return it, making the transaction into a הַלְוָאָה, and therefore the payment of a sela per month should constitute רִבִּית. However רַב שֵׁשֶׁת said: It means that he did not make it a matter of lending money while the cow was alive, meaning that he did not obligate himself to return this specific sum to him if the value of the cow decreased, but rather agreed to pay the set payment of thirty dinars only after its death. Therefore, the transaction was not a הַלְוָאָה and the monthly payment is not רִבִּית. According to this baraisa, the halacha should be the same in the case of a ship.
And the men of pitch [ בְּנֵי כוּפְרָא], i.e., sailors, are accustomed to paying rent at the time of pulling and paying for damage at the time of breakage. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that this matter depends on custom? Is there no halacha with regard to this issue? The Gemara answers: Because the baraisa taught this, it is an acceptable custom and therefore permitted.
This is a good point to reiterate the concept that as long as there is risk accepted in the transaction, in this case the potential for the boat to be returned with the status that it is worth less than when it was given, then the exchange is not classified as a הַלְוָאָה and therefore רִבִּית does not apply.
רַב עָנָן says in the name of שְׁמוּאֵל: It is permitted to lend with רִבִּית money belonging to orphans. Since the orphans are minors and exempt from mitzvos, the prohibition against taking רִבִּית does not apply to them. רַב נַחְמָן said to him: Because they are orphans we may feed them prohibited items? (In harsher language, he added: Orphans that consume that which is not theirs will follow their deceased parent to the graveyard.) It it unlikely that this was שְׁמוּאֵל’s intention. Therefore רַב נַחְמָן asked רַב עָנָן to clarify exactly he heard שְׁמוּאֵל say
רַב עָנָן said to him: There was a certain kettle that belonged to the children of מָר עוּקְבָא, who were minor orphans, and this kettle was in the house of מָר שְׁמוּאֵל, who would rent it out on behalf of the orphans. מָר שְׁמוּאֵל would weigh it and then give it out, and when the renter returned it מָר שְׁמוּאֵל would weigh it and take it back, and he would take a rental fee for use of the kettle and would also take payment for depreciation of the kettle due to the reduction in the weight of the metal. In general, the halacha is that if he takes a rental fee, he should not take payment for depreciation, and if he takes payment for depreciation, this means the kettle was a loan, and therefore he should not take a rental fee, as by taking both, it is interest. Nevertheless, מָר שְׁמוּאֵל did so with the kettle belonging to מָר עוּקְבָא’s children, which means he rendered it permitted for the orphans to take רִבִּית.
רַב נַחְמָן said to him: There is no proof from a case like this, as even for bearded ones (adults) it is permitted to act in this manner, as the owners accept upon themselves the depreciation of the copper, as the more the copper is burned, the more the value of the pot is diminished. Since this is so, the renters pay for the visible depreciation as measured by the reduction in the weight of the vessel, and therefore this arrangement is certainly permitted.
רַבָּה בַּר שֵׁילָא says in the name of רַב חִסְדָּא (and some say that רַבָּה בַּר יוֹסֵף בַּר חָמָא said in the name of רַב שֵׁשֶׁת): It is permitted to lend the money of orphans to be invested in a business venture that is close to profit [קָרוֹב לְשָׂכָר] and far from loss. Since this is אַבַק רִבִּית which is מִדְרַבָּנָן, the חַכָמִים permitted it in the case of יְתוֹמִים who were קְטַנִים, in order that their inheritance be preserved for them. Note Rashi’s comment regarding קָרוֹב לְשָׂכָר:
קרוב לשכר – שהיו יתומים נוטלין חלק בשכר ואין נוטלין חלק בהפסד אבל רבית ממש לא אלא מה שישתכרו מעותיהם יחלוקו ואע”ג דבדיקנני אסור לאו רבית ממש הוא אלא אבק רבית הוא ומדרבנן וביתמי לא גזור שלא יכלו מעותיהם להאכילם פרוטה אחר פרוטה
We proceed to a synopsis of the risk/reward ratio in investments, and how the Gemara characterized people accordingly:
The חַכָמִים taught: If there is a joint venture in which the conditions for the investor are close to profit [קָרוֹב לְשָׂכָר – profit is almost a certainty] and far from loss [רָחוֹק לְהֶפְסֵד – the probability of loss is remote], then the investor is a רָשָׁע, as this is similar to a הַלְוָאָה with רִבִּית. If the conditions for the investor are close to loss and far from profit [קָרוֹב לְהֶפְסֵד וְרָחוֹק לְשָׂכָר], then he is a חָסִיד, as he accepts additional restrictions upon himself in order to be absolutely sure he is not taking interest. If the probabilities of profit and loss are equally distributed [קָרוֹב לָזֶה וְלָזֶה, רָחוֹק מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה], this is the quality of every person who acts in accordance with halacha.
Let’s zoom ahead to finish with the screen sharing by Rabbi Stern of יורה דעה סימן ק״ס הלכות רבית סעיף י״ח:
כל רבית דרבנן מותר במעות של יתומים או של הקדש עניים או תלמוד תורה או צורך בית הכנסת: הגה וכן נוהגין להקל (ב”י בשם הרמב”ם והרא”ש) אע”ג דיש מחמירין דאינו מותר רק בבית דין (מרדכי דא”נ וכן משמע במהרא”י ובת”ה סימן ס”ה ובח”ה סי’ ר”ן ורש”י פרק א”נ דף ע’ סוף ע”א) . יש מקומות שנוהגים שאפוטרופוס מלוה מעות יתומים ברבית קצוצה ומנהג טעות הוא ואין לילך אחריו (מהרי”ל בתשובה) וכל אפוטרופוס שעושה כן עי’ בחושן המשפט סי’ ל”ד אם נפסל. אבל ברבית דרבנן שרי כל זמן שלא הגדיל היתום לעסוק במעותיו כדרך שאר אנשים אע”פ שכבר הוא בן י”ג שנה הואיל ולא הגיע לכלל דעת מקרי יתום לענין זה
For our purposes, we’re focusing on רבית דרבנן as being permissible to safeguard the money of יתומים. And we are lenient in this matter, states the רמ״א, even though there are those who are stringent (such as Rashi). There are some places, the רמ״א continues, where it is customary for an אפוטרופוס to engage in loans on behalf of יתומים that constitute רבית קצוצה, but this is in error and that custom should not be followed. But an אפוטרופוס can engage in רבית דרבנן on behalf of יתומים (who are minors), as noted in our Gemara. Noteworthy is the fact that this distinction isn’t based on the age of 13, but is dependent on דעת, or the orphan’s knowledge in business matters irrespective of age.
Yesterday we discussed the “workaround” known as הֶיתֵּר עִיסְקָא. This is a halachically permissible way of structuring a loan so that it is technically a business investment rather than a הַלְוָאָה, and the prohibition of רִבִּית therefore does not apply. Here is a graphic from the Kosher Financial Institute that depicts how banks in Israel differentiate the mechanism from a conventional loan, so that it is חַצִי מִלְוֶה חַצִי פִּקָדוֹן:
There are many resources online that elaborate הֶיתֵּר עִיסְקָא, and one of the more useful ones was written in 2018 by Rabbi Shmuel Banilivy in a publication known as תשמרו לעשות. I’d encourage you to read the two page article through this link, which ends with this concise summary:
“The concept of charging Interest in Jewish law is a very complicated and well-spoken about topic. That being said, over the past few hundred years a business structure has been instituted, that in the event the charging of interest exists in a business transaction between two Jews, this contract is the appropriate mode to be used. What it does is “redefine” our interest-bearing loan into a partnership. Through this re-definition we transform the original lender and borrower structure into that of two partners in the ordinary course of business. With no increased liability, and barely any extra paperwork, there is no reason why someone already entering a transaction of this sort should not be using a heter iska.”
In his article, Rabbi Banilivy cites a phenomenal two volume seferby הגאון ר׳ משה לוי זצ״ל titled מלוה ה׳ which contains a sample נוסח היתר עיסקא as follows:
אני _________________ החתום מטה, מודה בזאת כי קבלתי סך _ מאת____________ בתורת עיסקא, והתחייבתי להתעסק בסך הנ”ל שיראה בעיני שהוא קרוב יותר להרויח בו. אולם אם אצטרך להשתמש לפעמים בכסף הנ”ל לצרכי השונים לא אחשב גזלן. הריוח או ההפסד שיהיה בכסף הנ”ל יחולק שוה בשוה ביני ובין בעל הכסף הנ”ל, ובכל אופן שיהיה אנכה מחלקן של בעל הכסף הנ”ל, סכום השוה לדולר אחד אמריקאי עבור טירחתי בחלקו בתקופת השותפות. הוסכם בינינו שלא אהיה נאמן לומר שהפסדתי בסך שקיבלתי בתורת עיסקא אלא אם יעידו שני עדים כשרים ונאמנים שאין להם קירבה משפחתית אלי ואינם קשורים בשום צד לעסקים שלי, שהפסדתי בכסף העיסקא למרות שהתעסקתי בו בדרך הטובה ביותר. גם הוסכם בינינו שלא אהיה נאמן על סכום הריוח אלא בשבועה חמורה. אולם בפירוש הוסכם בינינו שאם ארצה ליתן לו עבור חלקו בריוח לאחר ניכוי שכר טירחתי, סך _ בכל חודש. הריני פטור מכל שבועה, וגם אם ארויח יותר יהיה המותר שייך לי בלבד. הריני מתחייב בזה להחזיר את הסך הנ”ל שקבלתי בתורת עיסקא לא יאוחר מיום __________________ עם זאת הוסכם בינינו שכל זמן שלא אחזיר את הסך הנ”ל שקיבלתי בתורת עיסקא, ישאר הסך הנ”ל בידי בתורת עיסקא על פי התנאים הנ”ל. כל האמור לעיל קבלתי על עצמי בקנין סודר כתיקון חז”ל. והכל שריר ובריר וקיים. ובאתי על החתום __________________
Another excellent online resource is heteriska.org. It has a sample English version of a Heter Iska contract issued by a Rabbinical Court in Lakewood, New Jersey which you can take a look at here.
Lastly, the Halachipedia entry on Heter Iska is an excellent one as well, which you can check out here.
As Rabbi Stern reviews, our Gemara indicates three different opinions regarding the level that a working partner to the Iska arrangement has to nominally be paid by the managing partner:
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה – he dips in your herring sauce (the most lenient opinion)
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – manage whey and remnant wool of the cattle herd
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל – retaining the גְלָלִים of the animals to use as fertilizer
With that background, let’s begin today’s Daf toward the bottom of דף ס״ח עמוּד ב, with a number of cases illustrative of the הֶיתֵּר עִיסְקָא arrangement:
The Gemara relates: A business document emerged concerning the sons of רַב עִילִישׁ, as it was a venture entered into by their late father, in which it was written that רַב עִילִישׁ and his partner will share one-half of the profit and one-half of the loss. רָבָא said: רַב עִילִישׁ was a great man, and therefore he would not feed people with something forbidden. In other words, he certainly would not have involved himself in a joint venture through which someone would have earned money by means of interest, and an arrangement of this kind appears to constitute interest. Consequently, no matter what, there must have been some mistake with regard to this document. If the actual condition stated that one party would receive one-half of the profit, the other party must have agreed to accept upon himself two-thirds of the loss …
… or it must have been that the other party accepted one-half of the loss and that רַב עִילִישׁ was entitled to two-thirds of the profit. Either way, the disparity in the terms served as payment to רַב עִילִישׁ for his effort, removing any concern about violation of the prohibition of רִבִּית.
רַב כָּהֲנָא stated: I said this halacha before רַב זְבִיד מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא and he said to me: Why is it certain that the document included all the details of the transaction? Perhaps רַב עִילִישׁ immersed his bread in brine together (dipped in the herring sauce) with the other party? According to the opinion of רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, this would suffice to avoid the prohibition of רִבִּית, and רַב נַחְמָן says: The halacha is in accordance with the opinion of רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
רַב כָּהֲנָא said to רַב זְבִיד: It was not stated by רַב נַחְמָן that the halacha is in accordance with the opinion of רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, but rather it was stated that a single opinion is common to all three opinions (that we noted above – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה and רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה and רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל). This does not establish the halakcha in accordance with their statements, but on the contrary, they all hold one common opinion that is not accepted as the halacha.
The Gemara comments: This too stands to reason, as, if you do not say so, why did Rav Naḥman list them individually and say: The halacha is in accordance with the opinion of so-and-so, and the halacha is in accordance with the opinion of so-and-so? Instead let רַב נַחְמָן say simply: The halacha is in accordance with the opinion of רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, as he is the most lenient of all of them, and their rulings can be derived from his. Since רַב נַחְמָן did not state this, it is reasonable to say that he was not issuing a ruling in accordance with their opinion, but simply clarifying that these three opinions are actually one.
The Gemara now pivots to an illustration regarding wages based in a dispute between רַב and שְׁמוּאֵל:
If one says to another: I am giving you a calf to fatten, and let us divide the profit between us when it is sold, and the surplus over one-third of its current value is your wages, meaning that they will split the profits up to one-third of the value of the calf, and any additional profits will belong exclusively to the one who fattened the animal and serve as his wages, this arrangement is מוּתָּר, because the one fattening the calf is compensated for his efforts, and there is therefore no interest on the part that is a loan. And שְׁמוּאֵל says: It is not permitted, because if there is no surplus over one-third and he goes home empty-handed, he will have worked for free, and this is considered interest. Rather, שְׁמוּאֵל says: The owner of the calf must set aside a dinar for the other, to compensate him for his efforts in the event that there is no surplus over one-third.
Does רַב not hold that he is required to set aside a dinar for him? Elsewhere רַב suggests a different way to structure such an arrangement, that the head of the calf is given to the fattener. In other words, they may divide most of the profits evenly, but the head of the calf is given as a supplement to the one who does the fattening. In essence he’s saying that the surplus over one-third is your wages, and (according to ב) the calf’s owner must nevertheless also give him the head in case there is no surplus.
Au contriare. רַב was referring to a case where the owner of the calf said to him: Either he will receive the surplus over one-third, or the head of the calf will serve as wages to the fattener. Or if you wish, say instead: When רַב says that if the owner said to him: The surplus over one-third is your wages it is מוּתָּר, this was a case where the one fattening the calf already had his own animal to fatten, as people say in a common adage: גַּבֵּיל לְתוֹרָא, גַּבֵּיל לְתוֹרֵי (“Mix food for an ox, mix for oxen”), meaning that since he already has to prepare food for one ox, it is not a big inconvenience and expense for him to add food for an additional ox, so the surplus over one-third is sufficient to compensate him.
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מֵהַגְרוֹנְיָא purchased an animal, and gave it to his sharecropper to fatten it, and gave him the head as his wages and gave him one-half of the profits. The sharecropper’s wife who drove a hard bargain said to him: If you would have participated with him in the purchase of the animal he would have given you the tail also. The next time, the sharecropper went and purchased the calf with רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, and רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר gave him one-half of the tail and suggested they divide the head. The sharecropper said to him: “Now will you not also give me as you did initially? Before, when I was not a partner in the animal but accepted it only in order to fatten it, you gave me the entire head. Now that I am a partner with you, are you going to give me only one-half of the head”?
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר said to him: Until now the money was mine, and had I not given you a little more value as compensation for your efforts, it would have appeared to be like רִבִּית. But now that we are partners, what can you say? That you must exert a little more effort than I do to take the animal in and out of the pasture? Waah … As people say in a common adage: “An ordinary sharecropper subjugates himself to the owner to bring him pasture. Sharecroppers are accustomed to expending extra effort on behalf of the owner of the field.” Therefore we are equal partners and divide everything.
Let’s zoom ahead just a bit, to gain insight into adjudication between business partners. In this instance it involves two כּוּתִים (“Samaritans”), and רַב פָּפָּא as the judge in their dispute:
Two כּוּתָאֵי entered into a joint venture. One of them went and divided the money without the knowledge of the other. They came for judgment before רַב פָּפָּא who said to the plaintiff: “What difference does it make?” In other words, because he didn’t lose anything, he has no claim to being wronged.
The next year these same two purchased wine together, and the other one arose and divided the wine without the knowledge of the other. And again, they came for judgment before רַב פָּפָּא, who asked the defendant: Who divided it for you? You didn’t act properly since you didn’t get your partner’s permission to divide the wine. The Samaritan said to him: I see that the Master pursues me in order to harass me, since last year, when we came with what appears to be essentially the same case, you gave a different ruling in favor of the other. רַב פָּפָּא said:
In a case like this it’s certainly necessary to inform the litigant of the reasons for the decision. Although a judge is not always obligated to explain the reasons for his decision to the litigants, in a case like this, where there is room for suspicion, he must. רַב פָּפָּא explained: Last year, when the other individual divided money, did he take the good coins and leave the deficient ones?
The כּוּתִּי said to him: No, he simply divided the money without any particular consideration, and that was acceptable, as there is no difference between one coin and another. רַב פָּפָּא said to him: With regard to wine, everyone knows that there is sweet and non-sweet, so it is not equitable to simply divide the barrels evenly. Therefore, I ruled that you were not entitled to divide the wine without your partner’s knowledge.
Rabbi Stern pointed out the Tosafos which elaborates that normally a judge doesn’t have to explain the basis for his judgement. But when one party feels that there prejudice against him, it is appropriate for the judge to explain the basis for his decision:
כי האי גוונא ודאי צריך לאודועיה – משמע דוקא הכא לפי שהיה לו פתחון פה לחשדו קאמר דצריך לאודועיה משום והייתם נקיים מה’ ומישראל (במדבר ל״ב:כ״ב) אבל בעלמא לא והא דאמר בסוף זה בורר (סנהדרין דף לא: ושם ד”ה ואם) שנים שנתעצמו לדין שכופין אותו ודן בעירו ואם אמר כתבוני מאיזה טעם דנתוני כותבין ונותנין : לו אר”ת מכח ההיא דהכא דוקא התם דלא רצה לדון אלא על ידי כפייה אבל אם מדעתו דנו אותו אין כותבין ונותנין לו וי”מ דהכא כל כה”ג צריך לאודועיה דלא איירי הודעה מאיזה טעם חייבו אלא היה משיבו כל כה”ג היה לך להודיעו כשחלקת ולא היה לך לחלוק שלא מדעתו
One may appraise a cow or a donkey or any item that generates revenue while it eats and give it to another to feed it and take care of it in exchange for one-half the profits, with the one who cares for the animal benefiting from the profits it generates during the period in which he raises it. Afterward, they divide the profit that accrues due to appreciation in the value of the animal and due to the offspring it produces. In a place where it is customary to divide the offspring immediately upon their birth, they divide them, and in a place where it is customary for the one who cared for the mother to raise the offspring for an additional period of time before dividing them, he shall raise them.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may appraise a calf together with its mother or a foal with its mother even though these young animals do not generate revenue while they eat. The costs of raising the young animal need not be considered. And one may inflate the rental fee paid for his field, and he need not be concerned with regard to the prohibition of רִבִּית, as the Gemara will explain.
One may inflate the rental fee paid for his field, and he need not be concerned with regard to the prohibition of interest. How so? In the case of one who rents a field from another for the price of ten kor of wheat per year, and the שּׂוֹכֵר says to the owner: Give me two hundred dinars as a loan and I will use it to cultivate the field and equip it by fertilizing it and hiring people to work in it, and then I will pay you twelve kor per year in addition to returning your two hundred dinars, this is מוּתָּר, as the two hundred dinars are viewed as a joint investment in improving the field, with the owner providing the capital and the renter providing the labor. [The שּׂוֹכֵר is, in essence, a שָׁלִיחַ of the owner.] The higher rental fee is therefore paid for a higher-quality field, and not as רִבִּית.
But one may not inflate the rental fee paid for a store or a ship. The שּׂוֹכֵר cannot borrow money from the owner to purchase merchandise to sell in the store or transport in the ship and in return increase the rental fee. That is considered a loan with רִבִּית.
רַב נַחְמָן said in the name of רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: There are times when one may inflate the rental fee paid for a store, such as in a case where one needs money in order to paint a design on its walls, or in the case of a ship, where one needs money to fashion a new sail [אִיסְקַרְיָא]. The Gemara explains: It is permitted when the money is borrowed to invest in a store in order to paint a design on its walls, because people will want to come to the more attractive store to purchase, and the profits are thereby increased. Similarly, it is permitted when the money is to be used for a ship to fashion a sail, because the profits from the use of the ship are greater since the sail is improved. Therefore, in these cases the arrangement is an investment, similar to the case of the field, and not רִבִּית.
רַב אַשִׁי said: The elders of the town of מָתָא מַחְסֵיָא told me: An unspecified mortgage [מַשְׁכַּנְתָּא] is for a year. The Gemara poses a question: What is the practical difference resulting from this ruling? The Gemara explains: It means that if the lender consumed its פֵּירוֹת for a year, the borrower can then remove him; but if not, the borrower cannot yet remove him, as an unspecified mortgage does not last less than this period of time.
רַב אַשִׁי commented further that the elders of מָתָא מַחְסֵיָא told him that the word “מַשְׁכַּנְתָּא” is referring to the fact that it resides with him [as in שְׁכִינָה, the spirit of G-d that resides among the nation; but note that in Hebrew שָׁכֵן means neighbor, as we’ll see in a moment[. The Gemara again asks: What is the practical difference resulting from his statement? It’s relevant for the halacha of one whose field borders the field of his neighbor. Since the mortgaged field is contiguous with his, it is considered his property to a certain extent, and therefore he is granted the right to purchase a neighboring field before an outside party does so. In essence, this is a type of “right of first refusal”. As Rashi notes: דשכונה גביה – אין שכן קרוב ממנו ואם בא הלוה למוכרה אין בבעל מצריה שכן טוב לקנותה כזה
רָבָא makes three short statements that the Gemara will clarify:
The halacha is not in accordance with those who approve of the tacit interest agreement of רַב פָּפָּא
The halacha is not in accordance with those who approve of the documents of מְחוֹזָה
The halacha is not in accordance with those who approve of the tenancies of נֶרֶשׁ.
#1: Rav Pappa would sell liquor and accept delayed payment at a higher price, and believed this to be permitted since he did not gain anything from the arrangement.
#2: In מְחוֹזָה they would lend money to someone for him to use in a joint business venture, and add the profits to the principal, as though the transaction were already completed, and they would write the full sum owed, including the lender’s share of the profits, in the document. The reason it is prohibited to do this is that who says there will be any profit? It is possible that the borrower will suffer a loss or earn less than expected, and he will eventually be paying interest if he pays the full amount recorded in the document.
#3: In the town of נֶרֶשׁ they would write a document in this manner: So-and-so has mortgaged his land to so-and-so, and the borrower then went and leased it back from him for a fee that was added to the payment of the loan. This transaction is problematic. When did the lender acquire it, such that he can subsequently transfer it back to the borrower? As he is not the actual owner of the field, the money for the lease is actually payment for the delay in repaying the loan, and therefore this arrangement is considered interest.
The Gemara comments: And nowadays, when we write a document in this manner: We acquired the property from him and we waited a while and then the borrower went and leased it back for such and such a price, a formula that states that the lender has acquired the field and may now lease it to others, which is utilized so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers, it is permitted, as it does not have the appearance of a loan with interest. The Gemara concludes: But this is not correct, as even if the field is in his possession, since he has not acquired it properly, it is considered interest [רִבִּית גְמוּרָה, as noted by Rashi].
Since it’s easy to get lost in the weeds here, so to speak, this is an opportune time to take a step back and look at the big picture. So rather than continue on with the technicalities as they serially appear in the remainder of today’s Daf, permit me to share the overview provided by Tzvi Freeman and Yehuda Shurpin on the pitfalls of רִבִּית:
“In numerous places the Torah (Hebrew Bible) prohibits a Jew from borrowing, lending or being a party to a transaction that involves charging another Jew interest.1 The Hebrew term generally used is ribit, which roughly means “increase.”
The prohibition of ribit is a strange one. It applies only when both parties are Jewish, regardless of how rich or poor they may be. However, a Jew is permitted to borrow money from a non-Jew and pay interest to him on the loan, thereby enriching him; and a Jewish person is also permitted to lend money to a non-Jew who asks for a loan and collect interest from him, just as non-Jews are permitted to lend and borrow money to and from each other with interest. Why the difference?
When it comes to forbidding theft, fraud and the like, the Torah makes no distinction between Jew and non-Jew. But then, unlike theft and fraud, there’s nothing unfair or underhanded about charging or paying interest on a loan, since both parties knowingly consent to the transaction.
Neither is it inherently deleterious to society. On the contrary, loans and interest are the two poles of the turbine that drives a healthy economy. When loans are available, merchants can make greater profits, builders can build bigger buildings, entrepreneurs can bring new ideas and inventions to the market, and families can live in better homes.
That translates as more class mobility, more jobs, more food, more clothing, more leisure time and more choices of how you want to live.
If there were no interest, there would be no incentive for anyone to make these loans. Money, after all, begets more money. You can put your money to work to earn a profit buying and selling, building and renting—so why should you be prohibited from charging a fee while your money lies idle, thereby incurring a loss of potential gain?
Loans on interest, then, benefit both the lenders and the borrowers.
Nevertheless, between Jews, loans with even the slightest amount of interest are forbidden, regardless of how rich or poor either party may be, or what use the money will go for. A Jew who wishes to invest in another Jew’s financial project can do so only by entering into some form of partnership (called in Jewish law a heter iska, which we will get to later).
So Why Is It Forbidden?
Looking at things this way, the question is turned around: If there is nothing inherently evil about interest, why then does the Torah forbid the practice between Jews?
True, there are many instances in which reckless interest rates can destroy an entire family. But the Torah could simply set guidelines establishing when interest may not be charged, and fix reasonable rates for instances when interest is fair play. Indeed, when it comes to the sale of merchandise, the Torah forbids exorbitant profit margins on staple products.2 Why not do the same here? Why forbid interest altogether?
Both Ramban (Rabbi Moshe ben Nachman, 13th century) and Rabbi Don Yitzchak Abarbanel (15th century) agree3 that as long as rates are reasonable,4 there isn’t necessarily anything morally wrong with ribit.
They explain that the reason Torah prohibits ribit between Jews is simply because your fellow Jew is family. It’s just not appropriate for family members to help each other out on terms of interest. The Jewish nation is meant to behave as a cohesive unit, like a single organism, each one concerned for the other’s benefit as much as with his own.
On the other hand, neither is it practical to treat the entire world as your immediate family—especially when they do not have the same laws as you. If you did, you would quickly find yourself out of resources.
So, although we accept the Torah’s ban on charging our fellow Jews interest, it would not be wise or helpful to extend this to all people. The Torah thereby renders us somewhat like a healthy organism swimming among many others in a big pond, which seeks its own balanced ecology.
How Do Jews Do Business Without Loans?
When commerce increased and investments became a more common part of life, the rabbis established guidelines for partnerships. This is the heter iska mentioned above. One person provides the money while the other makes a profit with it, which both of them share. The rabbis set fixed terms on such partnerships, both to distinguish them from ribit as well as to ensure they would be conducted in a fair and equitable way for both parties.
To this day the heter iska is in common use, especially in Israel. A competent rabbinic authority must be consulted to draw up such a document between parties.
But the institution of free loans has nevertheless always flourished in Jewish communities. In every major Jewish community, and in most smaller ones, there has always been a free loan society to provide interest-free loans to those who qualify. This way, everyone in the community can collaborate in a great mitzvah, which in the long run benefits all.
Indeed, Maimonides lists the interest-free loan as one form of the highest level of charity, along with providing someone a job or entering into a partnership with him, since this preserves the borrower’s dignity and enables him to get back on his own feet.5
Some Laws of Interest
The laws of ribit are extensive and complex. Here are just a few pointers:
Ribit does not apply only to loans; it applies anytime one pays more than the actual debt. As such, it would also apply to things like rent or purchases.6
In many cases, ribit would apply to “early bird specials.” (This is because the buyer is essentially paying less for having advanced money to the seller before the sale is actually realized; this is similar to a debt that the seller owes you, where he is then giving you more (e.g., a discount) than he is being given. For more on this, see Are Early Bird Specials Kosher?)
Even if both parties are in complete agreement (and even if the money was already lent), it is still prohibited to pay ribit.
Ribit applies not only to money, but to lending and borrowing items as well. So to borrow a few eggs from your neighbor and then pay her back with a full dozen would be problematic.7
Until the loan is paid, it’s forbidden for the borrower to do the lender any favor he would otherwise not have done.8
Redemption on the Merit of Interest-Free Loans
The Torah itself gives the prohibition of ribit as one of the reasons G‑d took us out of Egypt.9 Rabbi Yehuda Loewe, known as the Maharal of Prague, explains that G‑d desires the unity of the Jewish nation, and it is for this purpose that He redeemed us from Egypt and gave us the land of Israel.10
When people assist each other, they are uniting through their act of kindness. One who takes interest acts in the opposite manner, taking advantage of his fellow Jew’s misfortune in order to enrich himself. It is for this reason that throughout the generations Jews have scrupulously kept the prohibition of ribit, and Jewish communities generally set up interest-free loan organizations.“
2.Leviticus 25:14; Talmud, Bava Metzia 49b ff; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 227:1.
3. See Nachmanides, Deuteronomy 23:21; Abarbanel, Deuteronomy 23:16(teshuvah daled); Responsa Tzemach Tzedek, Yoreh De’ah 83. See also Likkutei Sichot, vol. 12, p. 119. (In the last-named source, there is also a discussion of why at times there is even a mitzvah to lend with ribit. See, however, Responsa Tzemach Tzedek loc. cit. (cited in Likkutei Sichot loc. cit., fn. 10) that this applies only to idolaters, and would not apply to most non-Jews.)
Bryce Harper has a ritual in the batter’s box prior to getting set for his swing. He’s been doing it as long as he can remember, and here’s a video of him doing it in his playing days with the Washington Nationals:
Watch carefully, and you’ll see that he taps the far end of the plate with his bat on the 3rd base side, then on the inner edge of the plate toward the first base side, then on the center of the plate, and then taps the underside of his lead right foot before raising hit bat to rest of his shoulder prior to uncoiling with that violent swing of his.
But long before Bryce’s nuanced ritual there was the ritual of one of my boyhood baseball heroes, Tony Taylor. I took Tony’s #8 and played his position of second base when participating in Phantasy Camp around 20 years ago. This isn’t me pictured there but, as you can see, #8 was popular with old timers. Tony wore it for eleven consecutive seasons, from 1960 when the Phils obtained him from the Chicago Cubs along with Cal Neeman in exchange for Ed Bouchee and Don Cardwell, through 1971. (Since then, several popular players have worn #8 including Bob Boone, Juan Samuel, Jim Eisenreich, and Shane Victorino.)
I never copied Tony’s ritual, which was more elaborate than Bryce’s, but it’s still etched in my mind. You can view it at the 8:27 mark of this video about Connie Mack Stadium, which features the collapse of the 1964 team (drawing attention yet again on this 60 year anniversary). Just before stepping into the box, Taylor would scrawl something with his finger on the head of the bat. He’d then take that finger and cross his heart. Keeping his right hand on his chest, he’d sculpt the dirt with his right foot, take a step back to tuck his left sleeve up at the shoulder a bit, and adjust his cup. He’d then take a half swing across his body and when coming to the midline tuck it briefly with both hands behind his head, and then cup his hat with his right hand as he stepped into the box.
To some extent, the pitch clock has cut down on some of the rituals. But if you watch out for them the reituals remain, serving the same purpose they’ve always had.
רַב נַחְמָן said: Now that the רַבָּנַן have said that אַסְמַכְתָּא לָא קָנְיָא, in a case such as that in the Mishnah, when one promised another land for the repayment of a debt, if the lender in fact took it, the land must be returned and the value of any פֵּירוֹת the creditor consumed from this land must also be returned. The Gemara poses a question: Is this to say that רַב נַחְמָן holds that mistaken forgiveness of payment [מְחִילָה בְּטָעוּת] is not valid מְחִילָה, meaning that if one forgoes repayment of a loan of a certain amount of money in error, he can change his mind? In this case, the borrower had thought that the lender had acquired the land, and he therefore allowed him to consume the פֵּירוֹת.
But it was stated that amora’im disputed this very issue:
If one sells the fruit of a palm tree to another before the fruit ripens, רַב הוּנָא says: He can retract and cancel the sale until the פֵּירוֹת have come into the world [בָּאוּ לָעוֹלָם], as the fruit is not yet in existence. But once they have come into the world, even if they are still unripe, he cannot retract, as once the fruits that are being acquired exist, the sale has gone into effect. And רַב נַחְמָן says: He can retract even once they have come into the world, as one cannot transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world, and the actual transaction was performed before the פֵּירוֹת existed.
And רַב נַחְמָן said: I concede that if the buyer seized the fruit and consumed it, we do not take its value from him. The reason is that since the seller initially accepted the transaction, although it involved a legal error, it can be assumed that he decided to waive his rights to the fruit and allowed the other to take it. Consequently, it can be demonstrated that רַב נַחְמָן holds that מְחִילָה בְּטָעוּת is not valid מְחִילָה. The Gemara rejects this proof: There, the discussion involves a sale, with regard to which it can be said that the seller waived his rights to the פֵּירוֹת. Here, it is referring to a loan, and not requiring the lender to reimburse the borrower for the פֵּירוֹת consumed would be considered a form of רִבִּית [actually מִיחְזֵי כְּרִבִּית].
Rabbi Stern pointed out what Rashi says here about the types of רִבִּית, and why this is מִיחְזֵי כְּרִבִּית and not אַבַק רִבִּית:
הכא הלואה היא – ומיחזי כרבית שמתחילה בהלואה בא לו וכרבית קצוצה דמי ואין אבק רבית בדבר הלואה אלא בדבר מכר כגון המרבה בפירות דמתניתין (לעיל בבא מציעא ס:)
The Gemara continues with a pertinent statement from רָבָא:
רָבָא was sitting before רַב נַחְמָן when he said that מְחִילָה בְּטָעוּת is valid מְחִילָה, and I wanted to raise an objection to him from the halacha of exploitation [אוֹנָאָה]. He observed me, anticipated my objection, and showed me that he was correct based on the halacha of אַיְילוֹנִית [a sexually underdeveloped woman] who is incapable of bearing children. רָבָא wanted to ask: But there is the case of exploitation, where the price paid in a sale was in excess of the market value (see 50b), which is a case of מְחִילָה בְּטָעוּת at the time of the sale, and yet it is not considered forgiveness. The seller must return the excess money paid. And he observed me and showed me the halacha of an אַיְילוֹנִית. Doesn’t the case of an אַיְילוֹנִית involve מְחִילָה בְּטָעוּת, and yet it is valid מְחִילָה?
As we learned in a mishna (Kesubos 100b): In the case of a קְטַנָה married off by her mother or brother who refuses to continue living with her husband [מְמָאֶנֶת], and in the case of a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative [שְּׁנִיָּיה ], and in the case of an אַיְילוֹנִית, each of these women is not entitled to payment of a כְּתוּבָּה, and they are not entitled to remuneration for the פֵּירוֹת that the husband consumed from her property while they were together, and they are not entitled to מְזוֹנוֹת and they are not entitled to their worn clothes [בְּלָאוֹת] that were brought into the marriage as part of their dowry and became worn out during the marriage. The אַיְילוֹנִית granted the rights to the profits the husband earned from her property while under the mistaken premise that she was married. Yet after the marriage was determined to have been contracted in error, the husband does not have to return these profits.
In Derech Hateva, Harvey Babich, Ph.D., chair of the Department of Biology at Stern College for Women, wrote a nice article on The Science Behind Some Mishnaic and Talmudic Passages which included a discussion of the אַיְילוֹנִית. He writes:
“An aylonis is a female that by 20 years of age has still not showed sign of puberty, in that she lacks at least two pubic hairs (Niddah 47b). Other identifying signs of an aylonisinclude the lack of breasts, experiencing pain upon cohabitating, absence of a lower abdomen characteristic of females (Rashi: the lower torso does not bulge outward over them genital area), a masculine voice (Yevamos 80b), and underdeveloped internal female organs (Rambam, Hilchos Ishus 2:6). Her physiologic condition impacts marriage, divorce, chalitzah , and yibum (Gittin, 46b; Yevamos 12b).
There is a thought that an aylonis is a female with Turner syndrome, a genetic chromosomal disorder. All normal human beings contain 46 chromosomes in their somatic, or body, cells. A woman with Turner syndrome has somatic cells with only 45 chromosomes, lacking an additional X chromosome, which is typical of normal females (XX). This abnormality arises upon fertilization, when either the sperm or egg cell lacked an X chromosome, producing a zygote (i.e ., fertilized egg) with 45 chromosomes. Girls with Turner syndrome are often short, do not start puberty, lack ovaries or have malfunctioning ovaries, have an immature uterus, lack a menstrual cycle, lack breasts, and cannot bear children. These overt physical signs parallel those of an alonyis.”
But that is not so; the halacha of exploitation is not a refutation of the opinion of רַב נַחְמָן, nor does the case of an אַיְילוֹנִית support his opinion, as there are differences between the cases.
אוֹנָאָה is not a refutation of his opinion, as the buyer does not know that there is exploitation at the time of the sale that would enable him to forgive him the amount he was overcharged, and therefore there is no forgiveness in this case at all. Nor does the case of an אַיְילוֹנִית support his opinion, as it is amenable to her for her husband to receive the profits in order that she receive the name of a married woman. She wants to be known as a woman who was once married, and therefore she willingly relinquishes her rights to the profits from her property during her marriage even if it will be found to have been contracted in error. There is no מְחִילָה בְּטָעוּת in that case.
There was a certain woman who appointed a שָׁלִיחַ who she instructed: “Go purchase land for me from my relatives”. He went and purchased land for her. The relative who sold her the property said to the שָׁלִיחַ: If I will have money in the future, will you give the field back to me? The שָׁלִיחַ said to him: “You and she and נַוְולָא are relatives, and I assume that you will be able to come to an arrangement between the two of you”.
[Rabbi Stern pointed out the Rashi here regarding “נַוְולָא”, an Aramaic term that some say can be used to refer to a male or female. Rashi however says that this was simply the relative’s name:
את ונוולא אחי – אתה והיא קרובים אתם ותתרצו ביניכם ונוולא לשון ארמי בין בזכר בין בנקבה כשרוצה לומר אתה והוא או אתה והיא כך ראיתי בתשובת הגאונים ואני אומר שזה שמה]
The Gemara discusses the halachic significance of this response:
רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא said: In the case of any expression such as: “You and she are relatives” that the שָׁלִיחַ says, the seller relies on the assumption that he will be able to come to an agreement with his relative, and therefore he does not conclusively resolve to enable the other to acquire the field.
We’re still rabid about רִבִּית. The Gemara comments: In that case, the land itself must be returned to its owner, but what is the halacha with regard to the פֵּירוֹת consumed by the buyer in the interim? Is it deemed רִבִּית קְצוּצָה [fixed interest] which is אָסוּר מִדְאוֹרַייתָא, and can it be removed from the buyer by the דַיָּינִין [legal proceedings adjudicated by judges]? Or perhaps it is considered like אֲבַק רִבִּית [a hint of interest], which is only אָסוּר מִדְרַבָּנָן, and therefore cannot be removed from the buyer by the דַיָּינִין?
Both רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא and רָבָא said that it stands to reason that the פֵּירוֹת are like אֲבַק רִבִּית, and cannot be removed from the buyer by דַיָּינִין.
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